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Many consumer protection initiatives were enacted or adopted
by courts and legislatures in the United States during the 1960s
and 1970s. The first major intervention, in 1960, was the
Henningsen case,' which held the standard automobile warranty
unconscionable; probably the last was the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's rule, in 1982, that prohibited the taking of security interests
in household goods, except for purchase money security. 2 In
between were the Truth in Lending Law, The Magnuson Moss
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Act, the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, and additional statutes and cases. Much
of this law preceded serious scholarly commentary. For example,
in the Senate debates in 1967 on the Truth in Lending Law, the
Bill's major sponsor, Senator Douglas, asserted that if 10% of the
consumers in a market shopped for credit, these "price conscious"
consumers would force firms to price competitively. 3 At that time,
no equilibrium model of price search existed: not only was there
no scholarly support for Senator Douglas's 10% figure, there was
no method by which to answer the question of how much
consumer search is necessary to ensure competitive pricing.
Consumer protection scholars produced a large amount of liter-
ature in the period between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. As
the legislatures and courts became passive, the scholars lost
interest. With the exception of the products liability and medical
malpractice fields, where courts and legislatures continue to
innovate, little scholarship is being produced. Two decades of
William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am honoured and pleased to
participate in a volume dedicated to Jacob Zeigel, a distinguished scholar, a fine colleague
and a good man.
I 32 N.J. 358,161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
2 16 C.F.R. Part 444, §444.2(a)(4).
3 Quoted in National Comm. on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United States
(1972), p. 176.
438 Canadian Business Law Journal
consumer protection literature resolved some important issues but
left much unsettled. Since the urge to regulate is stronger than the
sex drive, it is prudent to suppose that the consumer protection
movement will rise once more. Even tentative answers to the
questions that decision-makers then will ask are preferable to the
past practice of regarding existing statutes as topics for future
research. So I set out, in regrettably summary fashion, what seems
settled respecting unconscionability and imperfect information
and what remains in dispute.
1. Progress with Unconscionability
Arthur Leff observed in 1967 that courts were applying a two-
part test in unconscionability cases. A contract clause would be
held unconscionable if it was both procedurally and substantively
defective. A procedural defect exists when the contracting process
was unlikely to yield terms that consumers would freely choose; a
substantive defect exists when a term is "unreasonable", "unbal-
anced", "extreme" according to the standards of the time and
place. 4 Leff later observed that the focus on procedural defects
was odd. Courts were asked to evaluate the contracting process,
but there seldom was a contracting process; rather, contracts came
to consumers much as products did - as "things" that could be
bought or rejected but not changed.5
These observations led to the insight that courts should focus
less on the relationship between the individual consumer and the
individual firm, and more on the market in which the contract was
made. 6 Product markets work well when firms produce the goods
that people want, and sell them at competitive prices. If a
consumer contract is like a product, then the relevant question is
whether the contract is sold in a competitive market. The social
optimum exists when firms use contract terms that people want, by
and large, and price these terms competitively.
This conclusion implies that unconscionability is not a private
law specialty but rather a branch of the law whose task is to ensure
4 Leff, "Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause" (1967), 115 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 485.
5 Leff, "Contract as Thing" (1970), 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131.
6 An early recognition of this point is Schwartz, "A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive
Unconscionability" (1977), 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053. See also Eisenberg, "Unconscionability
and the Bargain Principle" (1982), 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741.
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that markets function competitively. The issue is what market
imperfections could cause firms to sell noncompetitive contracts.
Two such imperfections arguably are germane: the existence of
imperfect information and the existence of structural monopoly
power. 7 These imperfections also flaw markets for products and
services. Decision-makers therefore can draw on the institutional
and substantive wisdom that underlies the antimonopoly laws
when evaluating consumer contracts. Put more vividly, uncon-
scionability is antitrust.
Two important results follow from recognizing that the uncon-
scionability doctrine should function to ensure that markets for
contract terms are competitive. These results have been insuffi-
ciently appreciated because hardly anyone is paying attention.
The first result illuminates the relation between procedural and
substantive unconscionability. The second result concerns the
institutional implications of recognizing that unconscionability law
should be a part of the larger law of market failure.
(1) The Relationship Between Procedural and Substantive
Unconscionabi lity
It is helpful to begin with two distinctions. The first is between
the price term and all other terms. The second is among the
categories of imperfect information. This second distinction
requires elaboration. Three forms of imperfect information are
relevant to regulation. Imperfect information exists when: (1) the
consumer is ignorant of the legal relationship that the contract
creates. For example, the contract provides that the creditor can
repossess the debtor's property upon default, but the debtor does
not know this because the contract is written in fine print and
arcane legal language; (2) search costs prevent markets from
reaching competitive outcomes. Firms could sell a homogeneous
product at different prices only if consumers would not
comparison shop. High search costs reduce comparison shopping;
(3) consumers cannot evaluate the risks that contract clauses
allocate. For example, a disclaimer shifts the risk of product
defects to consumers. Markets will function poorly if consumers
cannot evaluate this risk.
A finding of procedural unconscionability implies a finding that
the price term is substantively unconscionable. Monopoly prices
7 Such power exists when a market has one or a few sellers.
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are inefficient. Hence, a showing that the seller has structural
monopoly power implies a finding that market prices are too high.
A showing that too few consumers comparison shop to generate
competitive prices - i.e., search costs are too high - also implies
a showing that market prices are inefficient. Finally, if consumers
are unaware of the price term, sellers will raise prices above
competitive levels. Hence, when prices are concealed or quoted in
forms too complex for ordinary persons to understand, prices once
more will be too high.
Matters are more complex when non-price terms are at issue.
Consider structural market power first. A seller with market
power can exercise this power through the price term or through
the non-price terms. Such sellers will exercise their power only
through price when consumers have decided preferences for
particular non-price terms and these are not excessively costly to
supply. This is because a monopolist does better selling what
consumers want at high prices rather than selling what consumers
do not want at high prices.8 When consumers can read the contract
and understand the relevant risks, courts ordinarily assume that
the terms reflect consumer preferences. This presumption of
conscionability should be accorded to a monopolist's contracts
also.
Matters are otherwise when the consumer cannot read the
contract or evaluate the risks that the contract shifts to her. In
these cases, sellers have an incentive to degrade the quality of the
non-price terms. Thus when the contract is unreadable or
consumers estimate risks incorrectly, the non-price terms should
be considered presumptively undesirable.
(2) Institutional Implications of Unconscionability
The second result holds that the unconscionability doctrine not
only is a branch of the antimonopoly laws but should dissolve into
them. This conclusion has the institutional implication that legisla-
tures and administrative agencies should be primarily responsible
for ensuring that markets for contract terms work well. The proce-
dural question that an unconscionability case poses is whether the
market in which the contract was made was imperfect. Courts do
attempt to answer market imperfection questions in antitrust
cases, though seldom to anyone's satisfaction. They do worse in
8 A model that generates this conclusion is set out in the Appendix, infra.
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consumer protection cases. So little money is at stake in these
cases, relative to the usual antitrust case, that the parties seldom
provide courts with the facts to answer such questions as whether a
firm has enough market power and the incentive to degrade the
quality of a consumer contract. More seriously, courts lack the
remedial power to resolve unconscionability issues. A court can
enforce a contract clause or ban it. Suppose a contract is flawed
because there is imperfect information. Often the best remedy is a
plain-language law, to make the contract readable, or a disclosure
scheme, whereby consumers are given the information requisite to
making a rational decision. Courts cannot create and police
disclosure schemes. Hence, the unconscionability doctrine,
properly understood, should function as a directive to legislatures
and administrative agencies, not to courts. The judges generally
should enforce what the contract says; the legislatures should
respond to the market imperfections that generate flawed
consumer contracts. This analysis leaves open the question just
what the legislatures and agencies should do.
2. Issues In Costly Search
There are three questions respecting costly search: (1) How do
search costs affect prices? (2) How do search costs affect contract
terms? (3) How should the state remedy market imperfections
attributable to costly search? I begin with prices.
(1) Costly Search and Prices
High search costs permit firms to charge supracompetitive
prices. If a homogeneous product such as bleach sells at four
prices, three of those prices are too high. This analysis teaches two
lessons. First, when substantial price dispersion exists, a market is
performing poorly. Second, the cause is high search costs: were
consumers to shop extensively, the high price firms would be
forced to lower their prices or exit; but search costs prevent
consumers from shopping extensively. 9
9 Price dispersion has been attributed to the existence of high search costs since Stigler's
famous article. See "The Economics of Information" (1961), 69 J. Political Econ. 213.
For a recent survey, see Burdette, Search Market Models: A Survey, Discussion Paper
#354, Department of Economics, University of Sussex (1990). A Canadian example of
the phenomenon is illustrated in Dahlby and West, "Price Dispersion in an Automobile
Insurance Market" (1986), 94 J. Political Econ. 418.
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This is well understood but a problem remains. The problem is
how to know when a product is homogeneous. While different
prices for the same product signal market malfunction, different
prices for different products do not. Thus the state must be able to
decide what the same product is. This can be difficult. For
example, a stereo sold in a downtown department store costs more
than the same stereo sold at a discount mall. Does a policy
problem exist? If a store with a liberal return policy charges higher
prices than a store that treats sales as final, should the state be
concerned? There is a question just how decision-makers should
condition on the existence of price dispersion when product
homogeneity is difficult to assess.
A second unresolved issue concerns the effect of reputation.
Search analysts usually model a static world. In that world, firms
will not compete on price when consumers will not shop. Hence,
high prices can exist in equilibrium. Reputation becomes relevant
in a dynamic analysis. For example, a firm may be able to increase
profits by pricing low to earn a reputation as a low price store.
When search costs are high, consumers will shop little, but that
little may include a visit to the store with a reputation for charging
low prices. Hence, a store can overcome losses attributable to low
prices and low volume in early periods with high demand in later
periods. This reputation effect has been demonstrated
experimentally, 10 but reputation has not been formally studied.
As examples of what is unknown, will firms that develop reputa-
tions later run these reputations down over time by charging high
prices to consumers who become habituated to visiting them
routinely? Put more abstractly, what is the optimal time frame for
a reputation? Does advertising make reputations easier to acquire
or does advertising create barriers to entry by low cost sellers?
Decision-makers could respond better to high market prices
caused by costly search if the scholars had more to say about
product homogeneity and reputation.
(2) Costly Search and Terms
Respecting contract terms, markets will function competitively
if enough consumers comparison shop: firms will supply
consumers with the contract terms that the consumers prefer at
10 Grether, Schwartz and Wilde, Price, Quality, and Timing of Moves in Markets with
Incomplete Information: An Experimental Analysis (mimeo, 1991).
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prices that equal cost. If too few consumers shop, firms may
exploit consumers by charging high prices for the contract terms
that consumers want or by degrading the quality of the contract
(or both). If firms commonly exploit through price, then the
standard unconscionability remedy of non-enforcement is miscon-
ceived. Courts should not ban contract terms that consumers
want. Whether a firm will exploit through price or not is partly a
function of the same two factors discussed above in connection
with the analysis of structural monopoly power, the consumers'
willingness to pay for desired terms and the costs of supplying
them. When consumers will pay for terms they want, such as
broad warranty coverage, firms will supply these terms unless the
terms are unduly costly.11 The third factor that determines the
firm's strategy is the extent of search: consumers must shop very
little for a market to ignore consumer preferences altogether.
The unresolved difficulty is that the willingness to pay and cost
variables are difficult for decision-makers to observe. The theory
cannot be made operative unless criteria are developed by which
to know when and when not contract terms are responsive to
consumer preferences. The willingness to pay variable is
especially troublesome. When public agencies do cost benefit
analysis respecting public projects, they sometimes ascertain the
citizens' willingness to pay with surveys. This technique may suffer
from response bias, but still it is better than guessing. There is a
question whether decision-makers would often have to guess
respecting the willingness to pay for contract terms, because there
are so many terms that too few surveys could be conducted.
Transmuting the insights of search theory respecting contract
terms into implementable rules is a problem in applied public
policy that is only partly solved.
(3) Remedies
Remedy issues also could be better understood. There initially
is a question whether price dispersion in markets is self-correcting.
Let two firms exist: one charges $100 per item and the other
charges $40. Then there is a profit to be made by someone who can
tell consumers where to find the low price firm at a charge that is
below $60. Will informational intermediaries emerge "naturally"
11 See Schwartz and Wilde, "Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests" (1983), 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387.
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to shrink price dispersion? Some do exist, such as cable television
stations that transmit comparative price data, but there may be too
few. Suppose that a firm does enter the market to tell consumers
where the low price sellers are. If consumers buy the informational
intermediary's service once, the market will have only one price -
$40 in the example here. But then the intermediary has nothing of
value to sell; there no longer is price dispersion to shrink. Will this
killed-by-success syndrome cause there to be too few informa-
tional intermediaries? If so, the state should be the intermediary.
Understanding how informational intermediaries work is an
important but unsolved problem in the theory of search. 12
Important issues of institutional design also require further
analysis. For example, should consumers be given price lists for
particular markets or an index of frequently purchased items?
13
How often should comparative price data be updated? What
reporting obligations should be placed on firms? Should the
central government or local governments play the major role?
These questions were asked and forgotten in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
3. Risk Allocation Information
There are three questions, broadly speaking: (1) do people have
enough information to make good decisions? (2) will people
misprocess the information they have or are given? (3) is effective
risk communication possible? I analyze these questions in two
contexts, product failure and credit default.
(1) Is There Enough Information?
(a) Product Failure
Two inquiries are relevant. Initially, do consumer risk percep-
tions correlate correctly with changes in product safety? For
example, suppose that a product is defective with probability .05.
12 When both sides of a market search for good "matches" and when different pairs of
contract partners derive different surpluses from a deal, there is a role for intermediaries
on a continuing basis. For a recent discussion see Yavas, The Role of Intermediation in a
Search Model, Department of Economics, Working Paper Series #90-28, College of
Business Administration, The University of Iowa (1990).
13 Disclosures of comparative price data have been helpful in reducing price dispersion and
market prices. See, e.g., Greene, Rouse, Green and Clay, "Behavior Analysis in
Consumer Affairs: Retail and Consumer Response to Publicizing Food Price Infor-
mation" (1984), 17 J. Applied Behavior Analysis 3.
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The manufacturer then invests in safety and reduces the proba-
bility of defects to .03. Consumers may perceive (a) a two percent
reduction in the defect risk; or (b) less than a two percent
reduction;14 or (c) greater than a two percent reduction. If
consumers underestimate the efficacy of safety improvements, as
in case (b), then firms will have an insufficient incentive to
improve products. This is because consumers will resist paying the
full price for increased safety if they underestimate the extent of
the increase. If consumers overestimate, as in case (c), there will
be too much safety. Since firms routinely alter products in ways
that affect safety, it is important to know whether the effect of
these changes is correctly perceived. Nothing is known about this.
The second inquiry is whether consumers correctly perceive the
risk level that obtains at a particular time. There are two ways to
answer this question. First, the question can be answered directly,
by ascertaining actual consumer risk perceptions and seeing how
well these correlate with the facts. Second, the question can be
answered indirectly, by inquiring whether there is or should be
enough information out there to make a rational choice, and
whether consumers are good enough information processors to
absorb that data. Before considering these approaches, their
relevance should be noted. If consumers think products are safer
than they actually are, then consumers will buy too many products
and have too many accidents. Call such consumers optimists.
Does optimism routinely exist?
As regards the direct approach to this question, there is no hard
evidence that consumers are optimistic respecting product risk
levels. The little evidence there is suggests that consumers are
pessimists, believing that products are more dangerous than the
products really are. 15 As regards indirect approaches, consumers
probably are well informed about the failure risks of frequently
purchased products. Infrequently purchased products that pose
serious failure risks usually are expensive. Cars and major appli-
ances are illustrations. Consumers engage in extensive search for
such items and markets provide considerable information about
them. Thus, there may be enough evidence for rational choice.
14 Such consumers may take the fact of a safety improvement as a signal that the product is
very dangerous.
15 The data are summarized in Schwartz, "Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A
Theoretical Synthesis" (1988), 97 Yale L.J. 353, at pp. 378-80.
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Hence, the conclusion that consumers are sufficiently uninformed
about risk levels to justify such doctrines as strict tort liability
apparently must rest on the premise that consumers misprocess
information.
(b) The Default Risk
Much consumer credit regulation follows from two assump-
tions. (1) Firms make more money from consumer defaults than
from successful transactions. Hence, firms induce consumers to
get in over their heads. (2) Consumers routinely overestimate
their ability to pay debts; in consequence, consumers get
themselves in over their heads. The first assumption is implausible
and has been shown to be false. 16 The second assumption is still
widely held. This initially seems curious. Consumers default
because of illness, job loss, overcommittment on other debts, and
other personal factors. An individual debtor is better informed
about such factors than is the creditor.
There is a second way to analyze the imperfect information
question, however. Suppose that consumers are alike, by and
large. Then each consumer wants to know what the odds of default
for consumers as a group are. Creditors do not routinely disclose
these odds. If consumers underestimate, they may get themselves
in over their heads. Whether consumers underestimate is
unknown. Thus, either consumers have enough information or no
one knows whether consumers have enough information. Given
the large amount of regulation that attempts to restrict consumers
from obtaining credit, society's ignorance respecting this issue is
regrettable.
In sum, many consumer protection initiatives of the 1960s and
1970s were justified on the ground that consumers lacked the
information to evaluate the costs of risk allocation terms.
Moreover, it was assumed, consumers routinely responded to
ignorance by making assumptions that produced bad contracts.
Guido Calabresi first asserted that uninformed consumers
routinely assumed that products were safe, and so bought too
many dangerous products. 17 This remains an assertion. The
question how much information is out there deserves more
attention.
16 See Schwartz, "The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods" (1983), 26
J. Law & Econ. 117.
17 G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970).
[Vol. 19
Unconscionability and Imperfect Information 447
(2) Do Consumers Process Information Incorrectly?
Legal commentators sometimes refer to the cognitive
psychology literature to answer the question whether consumers
are well informed. If persons generally make systematic cognitive
errors when processing information, then they will be badly
informed. Psychologists have observed that people do make
systematic cognitive mistakes in experimental contexts. Some
legal commentators have inferred from this evidence that people
make similar mistakes in markets. This inference is problematic;
there is less to cognitive psychology than meets the eye.
To see why, one must first understand the relevance of social
science laboratory experiments to life. Returning to the work on
costly search, suppose that an economic model predicts that prices
will fall as consumer search increases, and that consumer search
increases as the cost of search falls. Since search models are
mathematical in form, an analyst can assign arbitrary numbers to
the relevant variables and predict the outcomes. For example, the
analyst can suppose search costs to be zero and show that under
that assumption all firms in her model will charge the competitive
price. Such models can be tested in the laboratory. Experimental
subjects can be made to play the roles of firms and consumers. The
experimenter can vary the cost of search and see whether the
"consumers" search more or less and whether the "firms" respond
to variations in the intensity of consumer search as the model
predicts. 18 The laboratory is a real, though simple, economic
environment. If a model correctly predicts laboratory results, it is
a candidate for explaining real world institutions. The question for
a policy analyst is whether factors in the real world would make
the model inapplicable, such as the existence of statutes that
constrain the actors' behavior. 19
The psychologists have few models. They know that when they
manipulate experimental subjects in certain ways, the subjects
perform certain tasks badly. Whether real people perform similar
tasks badly outside the laboratory cannot easily be inferred from
laboratory performance. This is because without a theory, the
analyst cannot know just how "similar" the real world tasks are to
18 See, e.g., Grether, Schwartz and Wilde, "Uncertainty and Shopping Behavior: An
Experimental Analysis" (1988), 55 Rev. Econ. Stud. 323.
19 The theory underlying economic experiments is thoughtfully explained in Smith,
"Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science" (1982), 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 923.
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the laboratory world tasks. A theory is necessary to tell if things
are similar to each other. Until the psychologists develop more
models, their work has limited relevance to policy-makers.
I shall give two examples of these conclusions. Initially, Tom
Jackson tried to justify the prohibition on waiving the right to a
bankruptcy discharge on the ground that consumers systematically
underestimate the risk of default. If they do, then they will waive
discharge when to do so would be imprudent. 20 Jackson cited the
psychology literature's conclusion that people in laboratory
experiments underestimate the likelihood of disjoint events. A
disjoint event can occur if any of several antecedent causes occur.
For example, the consumer will default if she loses her job or her
child becomes ill or her spouse loses his job. A conjoint event can
occur only if several antecedent causes all occur. For example, the
consumer will default if she loses her job, her child becomes ill and
her spouse loses his job.
The probability that a disjoint event will occur is the sum of the
probabilities of the antecedent causes because if any one of them
happens, the event will happen. The probability that a conjoint
event will occur is the product of the probabilities of the
antecedent causes because all of them must occur. Persons are said
to underestimate the probability of disjoint events because they
forget to add all the antecedent cause probabilities; rather, they
add only causes that have high salience, such as the illness of a
child in the illustration above. People allegedly overestimate the
likelihood that a conjoint event will occur because they add proba-
bilities rather than multiply them.
According to Jackson, default is a disjoint event. In conse-
quence, consumers underestimate its probability. (If default were
conjoint, consumers would overestimate.) Jackson does not give
an argument for his conclusion. This apparently is because there is
no theory that tells when real world events, rather than laboratory
events, are disjoint or conjoint. Casual speculation suggests that
people's income is relevant. Much has to go wrong before a middle
class person will default on a car loan; for her, default is conjoint.
Any reverse may cause a poor person to sink; for him, default is
disjoint. Perhaps default is conjoint for the middle class but
disjoint for the poor. Thus the state should restrict credit for the
poor. But then there is the question at what income level does
20 Jackson, "The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law" (1985), 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393.
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default switch from being a conjoint to being a disjoint event? The
psychologists have nothing to say about this; nor does Jackson.
Thus this area of cognitive theory does not offer decision-makers
much help.
Perhaps another example will be useful. People's inferential
judgments are said to be affected by the availability heuristic. A
person using this heuristic underestimates the relevance of statis-
tical data in favour of evidence that is easily summoned to mind -
that is available. 21 Since vivid information is easy to recall, people
may, as examples, overestimate the odds of winning the lottery if a
friend has won it and underestimate the odds of getting cancer
from smoking if a grandparent smoked for 85 years and is still
healthy. Even if people's judgments are affected by the "avail-
ability" of information, it is difficult to justify particular forms of
regulation. For example, a person may overestimate the odds of
default if a friend just went into bankruptcy and underestimate if
he knows only rich people. Then poor people may be excessively
cautious about debt because they will know many defaulters,
while rich people may over-extend. On the other hand, rich
people may recall newspaper stories about particularly poignant
defaults and be careful, while poor people may be numbed by
knowing so many defaulters and ignore the possibility when
borrowing for themselves. Also, if default is disjoint for the poor,
causing them to underestimate its probability, but more vivid for
the poor, causing them to overestimate its probability, do these
errors cancel out? How is one to know? Perhaps criteria for
regulation cannot be derived from the availability heuristic.
To summarize, imperfect information exists if people lack data
or will process data incorrectly. It is unclear whether and to what
extent either information deficit is present in actual markets.
(3) Is Effective Risk Communication Possible?
There is a quantitative and a qualitative aspect to risk communi-
cation. Respecting the former aspect, an objection to providing
persons with information, rather than regulating the transaction,
is that so much information will be required that ordinary people
will not be able to absorb it. Respecting the latter aspect, an
objection to disclosure legislation is that information about risk is
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too complex to communicate. The former objection is unsound
but the latter objection is troublesome.
(a) Quantitative Aspects of Risk Communication
The objection that people will be unable to absorb additional
data respecting risk misconceives the way people make purchase
decisions. Several product attributes commonly are relevant to
consumer choice. A buyer may be interested in the color, weight,
performance characteristics and safety of an appliance. When
consumers purchase an item such as a major consumer durable,
which is bought infrequently, they commonly use two search
strategies. First, they do what is called a conjunctive search. In
such a search, the buyer decides which attributes are most
important to him and just how much of each attribute the product
should have. For example, a buyer may decide not to purchase an
item that weighs more than five pounds and lacks a fine-tuning
knob. The buyer then screens several products and rejects those
that score below his cutoff levels for the attributes that are most
important to him. When the buyer has assembled a final choice
set, he then compares the items on all salient characteristics; at
this stage, a low score on one attribute can be overcome by a high
score on another.
The buyer decides what attributes will be relevant at the initial,
conjunctive search stage primarily on the basis of personal
preference - some buyers care a lot about weight. The cost of
observing an attribute also is relevant. The question what
attributes to consider at the final stage again is a function of cost
and preference, but cost may be more important there because
every product in the final choice set satisfies the buyer's most
important preferences.
Acquiring and processing information is costly, and these costs
rise as the amount of relevant information rises. Consumers do not
become confused or make dysfunctional decisions in informa-
tionally rich environments. Rather, they modify search strategies.
When evaluating an attribute is costly, perhaps because consid-
erable potentially relevant data exists, buyers will tend not to use
the attribute at the conjunctive stage, and may not use the
attribute at the final stage. Product attributes that are too
expensive to observe are irrelevant to choice.22
22 The analysis in the preceding paragraphs derives from Grether, Schwartz and Wilde,
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The state should require disclosure of information about
attributes that consumers would want to make salient for choice
but cannot, because observation is too costly. Such disclosure
cannot be successful unless it reduces the costs of observing the
relevant attribute. For example, there may be considerable infor-
mation in the literature respecting the health attributes of certain
foods or food additives. Consumers cannot observe this infor-
mation because it is too costly for them to read the journals or hire
experts to read for them. Concise disclosure on a product label
may make the health attribute relevant to consumer choice,
because the costs of observing a label are slight.
The relevant question, therefore, is not how much information
would the state have to provide. Rather, the question is whether
the state can reduce the costs to consumers of observing attributes
relevant to rational choice, such as health and safety risks. Good
disclosure is cost reducing, not cost increasing. The state often can
reduce the cost to consumers of observing relevant product
attributes. Much disclosure legislation respecting nutrition and
other health risks is of this sort. Whether information relating to
the risk of product defects or job hazards can be communicated in
a cost reducing form is more difficult. The product defect issue is
especially troubling. Workers can be told things; consumers must
read labels or accompanying material. When the message space is
so limited and the medium of communication so pallid, conveying
risk information is very difficult.
(b) Qualitative Aspects of Risk Communication
This topic is very complex. Therefore, I will only introduce it.
There are two major difficulties. First, risk is an inherently
complex subject even if one believes that all risk is quantifiable.
Many products do not pose an x% probability of being defective.
Rather, these products fail in various ways, that occur with
different probabilities and that impose different costs. For
example, a new car will be "defective" with very high probability;
adjustments or replacements of items are common. It is less likely
that the car will be defective in such a way as to create a serious
risk to health. Also, minor defects cost less to fix than major
defects. Therefore, a car does not pose "a risk" of harm. To
"The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure"
(1986), 59 So. Cal. L. Rev. 277.
1991]
452 Canadian Business Law Journal
inform the consumer adequately of the risk associated with a car,
the consumer must be given a density function that relates the
differing probabilities of harm to their likely costs.
It would be difficult and expensive for firms to develop density
functions. Also, consumers probably could not absorb infor-
mation in this form. Many consumers will not have heard of a
density function or be accustomed to absorbing information set
out in a fashion that is congenial primarily to social scientists. Thus
there is a question when and how risk information can be commu-
nicated in forms that people will be able to understand and that
will also be informative. There is considerable discussion in the
risk communication literature about this issue but no general
agreement.23
Risk also has a more directly qualitative dimension. Suppose
that a product is defective one percent of the time. It can
malfunction in either of two ways. In 99.9% of the cases,
malfunction requires the buyer to replace a $10 part; in .01% of
the cases, malfunction causes blindness. Let the buyer value the
harm of being blinded at $two million. The monetary sum of the
two risks that the product poses is $20.10. Many people believe
that disclosing nothing about the risk of blindness, but rather
telling the consumer only that he faces a $20.10 risk, is insuffi-
ciently informative. But if the label warns of the risk of blindness
without qualifying words, many consumers either may not
purchase - blindness is very scary - or may ignore the more
common defect risk. The probability of blindness, however, is
only .00001. Given the small message space for communicating
product risk information, if firms are required to warn about
extremely unlikely but serious risks, consumers may not be told,
or may ignore, information about the common risks they face. On
the other hand, not to require warnings about qualitatively serious
risks is viewed, especially ex post, as depriving people of highly
relevant information: the claim of a person who is blinded that she
should have been warned is appealing. The question how to
convey multidimensional information about risk that is accurate
yet not misleading requires further research.
Similar complexities attend the giving of instructions. For
23 See, e.g., National Academy of Sciences, Improving Risk Communication (1989); W.K.
Viscusi and W.A. Magat, Learning About Risk: Consumer and Worker Responses to
Hazard Information (1987).
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example, is giving instructions respecting the safe use of products
effective without also disclosing the consequences of following or
ignoring the instructions? Because following instructions is costly,
a rational consumer would want to know what the cost buys in the
way of risk reduction. Today, firms often are required to give
instructions, which is the cost of safety, but are not required to
disclose what the degree of risk reduction would be, which is the
benefit of safety. Whether communicating information about
costs but not about benefits influences consumer behaviour appro-
priately is uncertain. On the other hand, communicating risk
information is difficult. Thus, current wisdom respecting the
warning/instruction issue is at an early stage.
To summarize, questions of effective risk communication may
be the new frontier for disclosure scholars. Much is known but
even more is not known about how to make risk communication
effective. It would be helpful to have more answers before major
new regulatory initiatives are proposed.
4. Conclusion
Courts traditionally would not enforce contracts that were made
under conditions of duress, fraud, imperfect information and the
like. The unconscionability doctrine was thought to be an
advance, because it made the courts' power explicit and no longer
suspect: §2-302 of the UCC tells courts to do what they always had
done, but to do it more openly and therefore more effectively. So
long as courts were using the unconscionability doctrine to
regulate actual contracts, the new wisdom made sense. The Code
drafters, however, did not anticipate the mass consumer trans-
action. Contracts used in this context resemble products more
than individualized agreements, and these "contract products"
are sold in markets. Thus the question relevant to contract
enforcement is whether the markets in which consumer contracts
are sold perform well or badly.
Courts are relatively poor social institutions for identifying and
remedying market imperfections. Hence, the unconscionability
doctrine should seldom be used. Rather, the problems in
consumer markets should be approached in a multi-institutional
fashion; the questions are what market imperfections exist, how
best can they be remedied, and what are the comparative advan-
tages of our various legal institutions? Legal scholars have largely
1991]
454 Canadian Business Law Journal
ignored these questions in recent years. This neglect is
troublesome because few good answers to them exist. If the
consumer protection movement were to rise again, decision-




This Appendix derives the factors that determine the answer to
the monopolist's question whether to degrade contract quality or
only raise the price, using the product warranty as an illustration.
To degrade contract quality is to offer contracts that consumers do
not prefer. Assume that the seller is a monopolist and that
consumers are alike25 and well informed about product risks. 26 A
warranty is a promise by the firm to repair or replace defective
goods. The firm's customers can prefer warranties or not. The
concept of preferring a warranty can be made precise. Let p, be
the maximum price that a typical consumer would pay for the
product with a warranty and let Pn be the maximum price that she
would pay for the product without a warranty. Then Pw - Pn is the
consumer's marginal willingness to pay for warranty coverage. Let
cw be the marginal cost of selling the product with a warranty and c
be the marginal cost of selling the product without a warranty.
Then cw - c is the marginal cost of offering a warranty. A consumer
prefers a warranty when her marginal willingness to pay for it
exceeds the marginal cost of producing it, or when
(1) pw-Pn > Cw- c.
A monopolist that agrees to replace defective goods must
24 The model is based on the model in Schwartz and Wilde, supra, footnote 11.
25 When consumers have different preferences for product quality - some want faster cars
than others - and the firm does not know each consumer's preference, some consumers'
preferences respecting the product/contract combination may be unsatisfied. These are
the consumers who prefer low quality. Thus, relaxing the assumption above that
consumers have homogeneous preferences will not support the conclusion that monopo-
lists will produce low quality products or contracts. See Matthews and Moore,
"Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multi-
dimensional Screening" (1987), 55 Econometrica 441.
26 The assumption that consumers are well informed about product risks is not made
because it is true, but to facilitate the analysis of how monopoly power affects contracts in
isolation from the contributions of other procedural defects.
[Vol. 19
Unconscionability and Imperfect Information 455
produce more than one item to support each sale (because there is
a probability that any sale item will have to be replaced). Let o be
the monopolist's profit maximizing output when it sells without
warranties and ow be output when it offers a warranty. Then if a is
the probability that the product will be defective, ow = (1 - a). The
monopolist incurs fixed costs f when it sells without a warranty and
fixed costs f, when it sells with. Since setting up a system to supply
warranties is costly, fw > f. Assume for simplicity that the monop-
olist's marginal costs are constant. Total variable cost if the firm
sells with a warranty then is total output times variable cost, or
c.ow/(1 - a). The marginal cost of selling with warranties is total
variable cost divided by output: cw = c/(1 - a). Since ot > o, cw > c.
The monopolist will offer warranties when its profit from doing
so exceeds its profit from disclaiming. Let rrw be the monopolist's
profit from offering a warranty and ir be its profit without. Then
(2) 7rw = ow(pw- cw)- f,.
(3) 7r=o(pn-c)-f.
The firm will offer a warranty when
(4) ow(pw - Cw) - fw > o(pn - 0)- f.
Assume that consumers prefer warranties. Then equation (1)
implies that (pw - cW) > (pn - c). When the failure probability ot is
small, as it usually is for products, then ow is not much larger than
o. Therefore, willingness to pay - the magnitude of Pw - Pn - and
fixed cost importantly determine whether the firm will offer
warranties. When pw is noticeably larger than Pn and f, is not much
larger than f, the monopolist will make a warranty.
Casual empiricism suggests that the additional fixed costs of
setting up a warranty system are small. If this is so, then monopo-
lists will supply warranties when consumers want to pay for them.
The same logic applies to other contract terms. Hence, the
common conclusion that a firm's contracts should be suspect when
it has market power is incorrect.
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